Note that Disney ($DIS) has posted-up multiple box-office flops in a row, with the latest, Wish, being pretty much indistinguishable from having a zero opening weekend. For Thanksgiving weekend, which is usually a good time to release a movie (especially when nothing else high-ticket is running opposite it) that's a disaster.
Some of this is being blamed on "woke" elements, but the contribution of that is unclear.
What is clear, however, is that American business political leanings, expressed in their merchandising and public views, are wildly out of whack with the American mainstream.
Part of the problem, I believe, can be traced to how we do stock ownership and voting in America. That is, if you own Disney stock outright (you bought DIS in your portfolio) you vote the shares. But if you own them in an ETF, say by buying the SPY or one of the many others in the marketplace you don't vote the shares -- the fund manager does.
This is wrong; it is akin to saying that if you rent an apartment the apartment owner gets to cast your vote in an election. We would never tolerate this. We used to tolerate the gating factor of voting being the ownership of property early in America's history, and perhaps we should return to that or some other measure that you actually produce net-net from a tax perspective, but transferring someone's vote to another person on an involuntary basis harkens back to the days of three-fifths apportionment even though slaves themselves had no vote at all and thus such was less of an outrage than what we do today in the corporate world.
This is resolvable with a change in Federal Law:
For any corporation or other entity holding a tax ID number in the United States or traded on any United States public exchange said status is conditioned on voting, nominating and proposal rights only being vested in the actual human beneficial owner of the shares.
This would mean you (and not Blackrock, Vanguard or some other fund manager) could vote the Disney shares you held in an ETF. This would have to be figured out as to the "how" but in today's world of computers this is not difficult at all. It would mean that fund managers could not propose slates of directors, they could not vote in or out shareholder proposals and similar. Only the actual humans that hold the shares, through whatever chain of custody as the actual beneficial owners, could do that.
Now think about how and why this is important.
As a shareholder your best and highest interest is in the total return of your holdings, measured by dividends and share price appreciation over time. That's the entire point of owning shares in a corporation; you expect the company to make a profit and if and when it does you expect to share in the profits. How the firm allocates research and development, capital expense, employee compensation and similar all goes into whether they succeed or fail. Common stock is the bottom of the capital stack and has no protections; a bond issued by the company, which you can also buy, does have capital protection in that the equity holders lose their money first. You choose to be in that "least-favored" position because when good decisions are made you profit at a variable and hopefully higher rate, unlike a bondholder who has a fixed coupon that they will receive over the life of the bond (and thus, other than if the firm goes under, their return does not rise with the company's success.)
The fund manager does not make any more money if the firm succeeds nor do they lose money if the firm fails! Their entire source of revenue is fees, which they collect irrespective of the success of the company and thus also, to a large degree, irrespective of the gains or losses in the beneficial owners. Only through the derivative loss of business if the beneficial owners take their money and go somewhere else does the fund manager potentially lose prospective profits. They cannot lose capital as their capital is never at risk; they don't put up their capital to buy the shares they put up yours!
There is no way to align these interests. They are by necessity of the business in question divergent; you care if the firm makes more money or less but the fund manager only cares about how much he has under management. Therefore he wants to create new vehicles (e.g. new ETFs) which he believes can attract more investors, but the actual company performance in them doesn't change his income either up or down.
This in turn means the fund manager can apply pressure to the company even if it results in the firm making less money without his taking a loss! If he is allowed to vote shares held in the fund he can thus demand various policies, whether it be "DEI" or whatever and put into place directors on the board that will implement what the fund manager wants. Since the amount of money said manager gets is not inextricably tied to the performance of the firms in the fund this leaves him free to vote for whatever sort of social and political positions he wants the company to take whether it makes the firm money or not.
You, as the beneficial owner, obviously would see things differently. Perhaps you would consider such a policy "worth the cost" but I rather doubt it if it resulted in the company making less money, and more to the point many others would likely disagree -- probably enough of them to prevent your desire from becoming an elected winner.
Thus the fix is to change the law: Only the actual beneficial owner of a share may vote that share and only actual beneficial owners may issue proposals -- period. A holding company, whether its Blackrock in an ETF or Berkshire which is also publicly traded but is not operating a business that it holds stock in, may not issue such proposals, back them or vote any of their shares; they must instead solicit and have their shareholders, who are the true beneficial owners, do so.
If you want to solve this problem -- and the proliferation of money-losing (or less-profitable) actions that fund managers may like but your preference would be for the firm to make more money that's the only way you will resolve it.